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1 Background and Introduction 
This publication builds upon NASA/TM-2009-215794 “Lightning Pin Injection Testing on 
MOSFETs”, where standard lightning waveforms were pin-injected into power metal-oxide-
semiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs) to induce fault modes and degrade performance. 1  
Previous testing showed that MOSFET (IRF520NPBF) Gate-Source connections may be susceptible to 
lightning-induced failure, even when installed in systems in well-shielded and partially-shielded aircraft 
locations.  MOSFET Drain-Source connections were shown to be significantly less susceptible.  Previous 
testing also showed that device impedance decreased (current increased) after every failure.  Such a 
failure mode may lead to cascading failures, as the damaged MOSFET may allow excessive current to 
flow through other circuitry.  Analysis of the characteristic curves of the devices showed that for certain 
injection modes the devices can accumulate noticeable damage.2  In the previous testing, the MOSFETs 
were not connected to any external circuitry other than the lightning transient generator, and as such, 
without any bias voltage applied between Gate and Source (i.e. “OFF” state).   
The NASA Aviation Safety Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) Project is conducting this 
research to determine early warning indicators of avionic semiconductor component degradation which 
can be used to predict the onset of system failures. To understand the interplay between lightning-induced 
surges and aging on component performance, a collaborative research effort has been established between 
NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) HIRF Lab personnel and researchers at the NASA Ames 
Research Center (ARC) Prognosis Center of Excellence to determine the effects of lighting induced 
electrical transients on MOSFET components.  The purpose of this research is to develop validated tools, 
technologies, and techniques for automated detection, diagnosis and prognosis that enable mitigation of 
adverse events during flight, such as from lightning transients.3   The effort fits within “Aircraft Systems 
Health Management” Discipline-Level research, Diagnosis milestone 2.1.2.2 and Prognosis milestone 
2.1.3.1; and “Advanced Sensors and Materials” Foundational-Level Research milestone 1.1.2.1.  This 
report describes lightning environmental testing which was performed in May 2009, where MOSFETS 
were tested in the “ON” state. 
2 Objective 
The test objective was to evaluate MOSFETs for induced fault modes caused by pin-injecting a 
standard lightning waveform into them while operating (i.e. connected to a Gate-driver circuit and 
electrical current flowing between Drain and Source.).  Lightning Pin-Injection testing was performed at 
NASA LaRC.  Subsequent fault-mode and aging studies were performed by NASA ARC researchers 
using the Aging and Characterization Platform for semiconductor components.  This report documents the 
test process and results, to provide a basis for subsequent lightning tests.  The ultimate IVHM goal is to 
apply prognostic and health management algorithms using the features extracted during aging to allow 
calculation of expected remaining useful life. This will counteract some of the negative effects of damage 
incurred by lightning by providing information prior to the components failure such that safe operation of 
the system is maintained. 
3 Approach 
NASA ARC IVHM researchers supplied 300 IRF520NPBF power MOSFETs.  IRF520NPBF 
MOSFETs are manufactured in a TO-220 package as shown in Figure 1.  The IRF520NPBF was selected 
to be representative of devices that are present in DC-DC power supplies and electromechanical actuator 
circuits that will be used on board future aircraft.  Most of the MOSFETs were characterized prior to 
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arriving at LaRC using the NASA ARC Aging and Characterization Platform for power transistors.4  
Elements of the system were transported to NASA LaRC to use for characterizing damage caused by 
lightning pin-injected transients.  Damage is characterized by measuring key static parameters, namely, 
threshold voltage, leakage current and breakdown voltage.  The MOSFETs were tested in the “ON” state 
by applying a bias-voltage between Gate-Source or Drain-Source during lightning pin-injection.  “ON” 
state testing required transient voltage protection of the DC sources used for biasing, as well as additional 
load resistors to limit DC current through the MOSFET. (More test setup details are provided in Section 
3.3.) 
          
 
Figure 1: IRF520NPBF MOSFET package (left), Schematic (center) and photograph (right).  Gate, Drain and 
Source are labeled “G”, “D”, and “S”, respectively. 
3.1 RTCA/DO-160 Lightning Waveform #4 
The RTCA/DO-160E “Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment”, 
Section 22 “Lightning Induced Transient Susceptibility”, was used.5   DO-160E Section 22 includes 
procedures for pin-injection and cable bundle tests, and is intended for establishing flight worthiness of 
airborne equipment.  DO-160E test processes are intended for assembled electronic systems, rather than 
individual components, so these tests were modified to accommodate the special situation of testing 
individual components.  The DO-160E lightning- induced voltage Waveform 4 “6.4us-Rise Double 
Exponential” was selected for these tests.  (See Figure 2.)  DO-160E recommends Waveform 4 for 
airborne equipment that may be subjected to lightning-induced magnetic fields coupled onto their wiring.  
(Waveform 3, “Damped Sinusoid”6 is also recommended for pin injection testing, however Waveform 4 
was favored by the NASA team because Waveform 4 contains more energy per event, and is thus more 
likely to induce damage than Waveform 3.  The NASA equipment is also capable of testing at lower 
voltage levels using Waveform 4.)  Peak DO-160E Test Levels for Waveform 4 are shown in Table 1.  
DO-160E allows devices to be un-powered during pin-injection testing, which may lead to results that are 
not representative of airborne equipment operating in an actual lightning environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: RTCA/DO-160E Section 22 Voltage Waveform 4.  
G  D  S 
  
4
Table 1: DO-160E Generator Setting Levels for Pin Injection (Source Impedance for WF4= 5 Ohms) 
Level Representative 
Environment 
Waveform 4 
Voc/Isc 
   
1 Well Shielded 50/10 
2 Partial Shielded 125/25 
3 Partial Exposed 300/60 
4 Severe 750/150 
5 More Severe 1600/320 
 
3.2 Facility and Equipment 
All testing was conducted in NASA’s High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Laboratory, located in 
Building 1220, Room 144, on 1 South Wright Street at NASA LaRC, between May 5 and May 29, 2009.  
The HIRF Laboratory is typically used for reverberation chamber radiated emissions and immunity 
testing.  However, the reverberation chambers are easily adapted to lightning testing.  An overview of 
HIRF Laboratory capability is provided in the Reference section7,8,9.  The HIRF Laboratory is equipped 
with EMC Partner MIG-System generators for lightning indirect effects testing, and is capable of 
performing DO-160E Section 22, up to Test Level 5 for pin, cable and ground injection for Waveform 4.   
The HIRF laboratory is also able to perform other waveform and multiple stroke and multiple burst tests, 
as well as additional test types beyond DO-160E.  Figure 3 shows the EMC Partner equipment that was 
used for pin-injection tests, and Table 2 summarizes the test equipment used. 
Table 2: Test Equipment 
Equipment Item Manufacturer/Model SN/ECN Cal. Due 
Impulse Gen.  EMC Partner MIG0600MS 260/2104741 N/A 
Step Down 1:8 Transformer EMC Partner NW-MS-Level1 SN002 N/A 
Oscilloscope Tektronix DPO4054 ECN1641291 1/9/2010 
Current Sensor 100X Pearson 5046  120468/A037686 7/9/2008* 
Current Sensor 100X Pearson 4997 121314/A037687 7/9/2008* 
High Voltage Probes (2) Tektronix P5100 N/A N/A 
DC Power Supply (20V, 5A) Tenma 72-6152 A014924 N/A 
DC Power Supply (30V, 3A) Tenma 72-2010 A014923 N/A 
Transient Voltage Supressor FCC-450A-7-L N/A N/A 
Transient Voltage Supressor FCC-450A-10-L N/A N/A 
Transient Voltage Supressor FCC-450A-18-L N/A N/A 
Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface 
Board 
Designed & Fabricated by John 
Mielnik 
N/A N/A 
MOSFET Test Board Provided By NASA Ames N/A N/A 
 
*The Pearson 5046 and 2997 Current Sensor calibrations were expired during this test.  Subsequently, on 
August 28, 2009, the probe calibrations were verified to be within specification. 
(NASA Ames personnel used a Component Evaluation System, consisting of a Keithley 2410 SourceMeter, 
a Dell PP05XA Notebook computer and a National Instruments GPIB-USB-HS adapter for their MOSFET 
characterizations.  The NASA Ames equipment was not part of the pin injection test setup but is later 
described in Section 5 of this report.) 
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Figure 3:  Lightning-generating equipment was used for pin-injection tests.  (EMC Partner MIG0600MS shown on 
right.) 
 
3.3 Test Setup 
MOSFETs are active circuit devices.  Operationally, the Drain-Source (D-S) impedance varies as the 
Gate-Source (G-S) voltage changes.  Operation of a MOSFET requires external biasing circuitry.  For the 
previous NASA/TM-2009-215794 testing, the MOSFET was not part of an active circuit, so test setup 
consisted of simply connecting the lightning generator and oscilloscope to two terminals of the MOSFET.  
Pin injecting lightning transients into a MOSFET that is “ON” requires consideration of the biasing 
circuitry in several different ways: 
 Protection of biasing circuitry from the lightning transient. 
 Protection of the MOSFET from excessive current applied by biasing circuitry. 
 Protection of the Lightning Generator from excessive current applied by biasing circuitry. 
 Assurance that biasing circuitry does not corrupt the MOSFET test results by modifying the 
lightning transient waveform. 
 
A test circuit satisfying these requirements was designed by the test team.  The schematic is shown in 
Figure 4.  Essentially VDS and VGS function to bias the MOSFET D-S and G-S junctions such that the 
device is in the ON state as the lightning pin injected transient is applied.  A Fischer Custom 
Communications (FCC) Transient Voltage Suppressor (TVS) was installed in parallel to both voltage 
sources.  The TVS devices function to bypass the voltage sources when the lightning transient is applied 
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(thereby protecting the voltage sources).  Current Sense Resistors (R1= 0.01 Ohms and R2= 0.01 Ohms) 
are at the Drain and Gate inputs to facilitate measurement of direct current, using a differential probe.  
Current-limiting resistors (R3 and R4, 10 Ohms each) are in-line with VGS and VDS to limit the direct 
current through the G-S and D-S junctions, so as not to cause unnecessary heating to the MOSFET or 
excessive direct current through the lightning waveform generator. 
The lightning transient was applied to either the G-S junction or the D-S junction, but not both 
simultaneously.  The lightning waveform generator has an internal impedance of 5 Ohms, so it was 
replaced by a 5 Ohm resistor (R5) when not present.  The G-D pin-injection configuration was not tested 
because such a test would require significant additional effort to protect the lightning generator and power 
supplies in the event of a G-D short-circuit MOSFET failure mode.  The MOSFET Source terminal is 
usually referenced to ground, so the G-S and D-S junctions are more likely to provide a lightning transient 
path than the G-D junction (i.e. lightning transients impart much more energy to common-mode rather 
than differential-mode coupling to aircraft wiring bundles).  This rationale for not testing G-D is also 
supported by RTCA/DO-160, which notes that pin injection is usually conducted between each pin and 
case ground.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Pin Injection Test Setup Schematic.  
In order to implement the MOSFET test circuit with safe, repeatable hookups, and test port access for 
oscilloscope and DC voltmeters, and to allow the use of interchangeable components (i.e. TVS devices), a 
Component Testing Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface Board was designed and fabricated.  High 
voltage components, recessed banana jacks and wide circuit-board traces were used to ensure personnel 
safety.  A photograph of the board is shown in Figure 5.   
 
 
VDS
VL
VGS
VL
TVS
1
TVS
2
R1
.01Ohm
R2
.01 Ohm
R3=10
Ohm
R4=10
Ohm
R5= 5
Ohm
R5= 5
Ohm
+
+
-
-
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Figure 5: Component Testing Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface Board.  
 
The Component Testing Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface Board was the focal point of the pin 
injection test hookup. The MOSFET under test was mounted in the NASA Ames IV-Curve Test Board 
used in previous testing (NASA/TM-2009-215794), which was connected to the Component Testing 
Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface Board.  Two handheld digital voltmeters were used to monitor the 
DC current flowing through the MOSFET G-S and D-S circuits, using the current sense resistors.  The 
use of a four channel oscilloscope, two high-voltage probes, and two current transformer probes allowed 
simultaneous monitoring of injected lightning voltage and current on both G-S and D-S circuits.  A 
complete Pin Injection Test Hookup diagram is provided in Figure 6.  A photograph of the hookup is 
provided in Figure 7.  Oscilloscope settings are provided in Table 3 and the Lightning Generator 
connections & settings are provided in Table 4. 
Table 3: Oscilloscope Setings 
Parameter Setting 
Timebase 20 uS (WF4)  
Trigger Edge, Source=Ext. Coupling=DC, Slope=Pos, Level= 8000mV 
 Channel 1 
(G-S Voltage) 
Channel 2 
(G-S Current) 
Channel 1 
(D-S Voltage) 
Channel 2 
(D-S Current) 
Level Varied Varied Varied Varied 
Coupling DC DC DC DC 
Position 0 Div 0 Div 0 Div 0 Div 
Offset 0 V 0 A 0 V 0 A 
Probe= 100X Voltage 100X Current 100X Voltage 100X Current 
Input 
Impedance 
1M Ohm 1 MOhm 1M Ohm 1 MOhm 
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Figure 6: Pin Injection Test Hookup diagram. (HV Lines were each 81.5”+43.0”= 124.5 inches long.  
Two sections allowed connection-to/bypass-of Attenuator Box.) 
 
GS Bypass
Jumper
DS Bypass
Jumper
LV Lo Out
LV Hi Out
5 Ohm LV
Bypass
Resistor
10 Ohm DC Limiting Resistor
10 Ohm DC Limiting Resistor
 GS
Power
Supply
 DS
Power
Supply
Lightning Transient Generator
GS HV Probe
DS HV Probe
Pearson Current
Monitor Probes
100x
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Figure 7: Pin Injection Test Hookup Photograph 
 
 
 
Table 4: MIG0600MS Lightning Generator Connections & Settings 
Connections -HV 
-Trigger 
-Use NW-MS-LEVEL1 Attenuator box if VPeak below 50V 
-Use Resistor Network if VPeak between 50V and 70V 
Settings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. On/Stby Press 
2. Safety Ckt- Closed 
3. Waveform 4 
4. VPeak: Test Matrix 
5. Polarity: “Pos” or “Neg” 
6. Trig. Mode:  SS=Manual, MS=Auto, Test Time, Repetition 
 
  
10
Some testing required pin-injection levels below DO-160 Level 1.  The EMC Partner MIG0600MS 
Lightning Waveform generator does not allow testing below 70V peak.  The NW-MS-Level1 Box 
reduces the open circuit voltage (OCV) to 1/8 the output of the MIG0600MS, allowing 9 to 50V OCV 
test.  To accommodate test voltages between 50V and 70V, a resistor network was used to reduce Open-
Circuit voltage of Waveform 4 by half, while still maintaining the correct source impedance.  
Operationally, the MIG0600MS is set to a voltage 2 times higher than the desired OCV when using the 
resistor network.  A schematic of the resistor network is shown in Figure 8, and photographs of the 
implementation are shown in Figure 9.  As an accuracy check, Waveform 4 with MIG0600MS setting of 
40V was applied across the MOSFET GS terminals.  47.7V was measured when using the resistor 
network (19% change from 40V), whereas 52.3V was measured when using the NW-MS-Level1 (31% 
change from 40V).  Based upon these results, the resistor network was more accurate, and was preferred 
for the 35V to 50V overlapping range. 
 
 
 
 R1= 5 Ohm Lightning Generator Source Impedance 
 RL= Load Impedance of Test Device (unknown) 
 R2= 5 Ohms (tested to within 0.1 Ohm) 
 R3= 2.5 Ohms (tested to within 0.1 Ohm) 
 
Figure 8: Circuit Schematic to enable Waveform 4 testing down to 40V Peak with MIG0600MS Transient 
Generator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: R2=5 Ohms (in parallel, top photograph), R3=2.5 Ohms (in series, bottom photograph), implementation. 
R1 
RL R2 
R3 
VLightning 
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3.4 Safety Hazards & Precautions 
Test Personnel were briefed on the standard HIRF Laboratory Safety procedures, including:  
 Location of Exits 
 Marshalling Areas 
 Location of Fire Extinguishers and AEDs, qualified AED Responders 
 Out-Of-The-Ordinary operations: (i.e. construction, blocked exits, auditory alarms, other testing, 
etc.) 
 
The following warning was prominently displayed in the test Plan: 
 
 
 
 
A Hazards Identification Meeting was held to discuss additional safety hazards and to identify 
precautions and controls to mitigate them.  Table 5 shows the hazards identified and their precautions and 
controls. 
Table 5: Lightning Generator Connections & Settings 
Hazard Precaution 
1. High Voltages (HV): Source Measurement 
Unit 
All Personnel: 1ft Clearance from Device and all HV 
connections when Keithley 2410 SourceMeter Blue 
Light is ON. 
2. High Voltages: Lightning Transient Generator All Personnel: 1ft Clearance from Device and all HV 
connections when Generator is in RUN Mode. 
3. Un-Authorized Personnel in Test Area -Post “DANGER: TEST IN PROGRESS” sign during 
all HV test operations. 
-Test Personnel instructed to Stop Test when 
Unauthorized personnel in Chamber B. 
4. Device Destruction during HV Test Place Clear Safety Shield over device during lightning 
transient testing. 
5. Inadvertent Operation Lightning Transient 
Generator 
-Push SAFETY CIRCUIT button to OFF on Lightning 
Transient Generators when test operations are not being 
conducted. 
 
 
 
WARNING 
The transient generators used in these tests produce lethal voltage 
and current levels. 
Exercise all operational safety precautions to prevent injury or 
death of test and support personnel. 
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4 Results Summary 
4.1 Pre-Test 
A Pre-Test procedure was used to determine the single-stroke test level required to cause permanent 
damage, for each input pin configuration.  The pin-configuration nomenclature used in this report is based 
upon NASA/TM-2009-215794 (MOSFET in the “OFF” state) for consistency and comparison, but was 
modified because the MOSFET biasing circuitry responds differently to MIG0600MS lead-reversal 
versus polarity change.  (Lead reversal versus polarity change is discussed in Section 4.1.2.) 
Table 6: Pin Connection & Polarity Nomenclature  
Pin 
Configuration 
MIG0600MS 
Waveform 
+ Lightning Voltage 
Connected To: 
- Lightning Voltage 
Connected To: 
G-S 4+ Gate Source 
G-S 4- Gate Source 
D-S 4+ Drain Source 
D-S 4- Drain Source 
 
The Lightning Transient Generator was connected as shown in Figures 4 and 6.  Single stroke 
Waveform 4 was used for all tests because it is representative of a voltage waveform likely to be present 
on aircraft interconnecting wiring paths due to the Current Component A wave shape, caused by 
structural IR voltages and diffusion coupling.11  Also, Waveform 4 was used for most of the previous 
NASA/TM-2009-215794 data, so it is preferred for comparisons with new data.   For a particular pin-
configuration, the test level was increased until a change was observed on the current & voltage 
waveforms displayed on the oscilloscope.  The MOSFET was then evaluated using the NASA ARC 
source and measurement unit characterization system.   
MIG0600MS Lightning Generator display data is used for the “V Peak Setting” in test data tables. 
MIG0600MS Lightning Generator display of peak Open Circuit Voltage (Voc) was measured at several 
setting points, and found to understate the actual peak Voc by 3% to 14%, which is within the RTCA/DO-
160F allowance of +/- 20%.     Oscilloscope-measured peak Voc data are published in NASA/TM-2009-
215794, and are repeated here in Table 7.  Oscilloscope-measured peak voltage and peak current values 
are also recorded in all data tables, and full voltage and current oscilloscope waveform data were stored 
for every test.   
Table 7: Peak Voc Data for MIG0600MS 
Vout Setting (Displayed) Measured Peak Voc (Waveform 4) 
10 11.0 *  (110%) 
20 22.6 *  (113%) 
40 45.6 *  (114%) 
80 82.0  (103%) 
160 164  (103%) 
320 332  (104%) 
640 682  (107%) 
1280 1359  (106%) 
1700 1798  (106%) 
 
*(NW-MS-LEVEL1 
Step-down 1:8 
transformer 
required) 
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4.1.1 MOSFET Biasing 
MOSFETS exhibit different D-S current-voltage (I-V) curve characteristics depending upon VGS.  
Each I-V curve on Figure 10 represents a different VGS trace for the IRF520PBF MOSFET.  Because of 
the I-V characteristic, energy deposited by an injected lightning transient across the Drain-Source junction 
will vary with VGS.  Therefore the D-S Fail voltage is expected to vary with VGS.  Two VGS-bias settings 
were selected for testing: 8 and 16VDC.  The rationale was that 16 VDC is the highest rated VGS rating, 
and 8 VDC is midscale.  (VGS-bias=0 VDC was tested as part of the previous effort reported in NASA/TM-
2009-215794.) 
Figure 10: I-V Curves for IRF520PBF (25 Deg. C). 
To accommodate the two different VGS-bias settings, appropriate TVS devices were needed to prevent 
lightning transients from back-driving the VGS power supply.  Devices with 10V and 18V clamping 
voltages were selected to protect the VGS-bias power supply set to 8V and 16V respectively.  (TVS devices 
change from open-circuit to short-circuit at a specified voltage, over range of about 2 volts. A margin of 
2V was selected to ensure the TVS would only be activated in the event of an applied transient, but still 
provide highest possible protection to the VGS power supply.)  Also, to provide DS forward bias (i.e. 
Drain ON) a 5VDC power supply was used.  For no forward bias (i.e. Drain OFF), a bypass jumper was 
installed across the VDS power supply terminals.  Table 8 shows the test biasing configurations. 
Table 8: MOSFET Test Biasing Configurations 
Config. Config. Description VGS-bias 
Setting 
GS TVS 
Selected 
VDS-bias 
Setting 
DS TVS 
Selected 
Notes 
G1 D0 Gate Lo, Drain OFF 8 FCC-450A-10-L OFF Bypass Not Tested 
G2 D0 Gate Hi, Drain OFF 16 FCC-450A-18-L OFF Bypass  
G1 D1 Gate Lo, Drain ON 8 FCC-450A-10-L 5 FCC-450A-7-L  
G2 D1 Gate Hi, Drain ON 16 FCC-450A-18-L 5 FCC-450A-7-L  
 
Only one Drain OFF configuration was tested, primarily due to a shortage of test time.  Figure 11 
shows the DS voltage and current with a 240V peak lightning WF4 injected into the DS terminals.  Figure 
11 shows that VDS and IDS levels due to the lightning transient are slightly higher when the power supply 
is bypassed (blue), likely because the bypass jumper has slightly lower impedance than routing through 
the power supply (black).   
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Data are also shown from NASA/TM-2009-215794 testing (Green), where 240V WF4+ was injected 
across DS terminals with no other circuitry connected.  Without Gate biasing, more current flows through 
DS with a correspondingly lower voltage.  As expected, VGS biasing lowers the impedance of the DS 
junction. 
Similarity between the black and blue (TVS and VDS bypass) waveforms provided confidence that the 
TVS devices were not modifying the lightning waveform enough to violate DO-160F allowance of +/- 
20%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Drain ON versus Drain OFF Comparison.  Peak Voc= 240V WF4+ was injected into the DS terminals, 
with VGS-bias= 8VDC and VDS-bias= 5VDC (Black) versus 0VDC (Blue, Bypassed).  (Device AO, Tests 19 & 20.) 
*Data are also shown from NASA/TM-2009-215794 testing (Green), where 240V WF4+ was injected across DS 
terminals with no other circuitry connected to the MOSFET.  (Device H1, Test 214) 
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4.1.2 Polarity Versus Lead-Reversal 
The test team initially assumed that inverting the lightning waveform could be accomplished by 
simply reversing the HV test leads connected to the Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface Board.  This 
approach was found to be experimentally invalid.  Figure 12(a) shows the GS voltage and current with 
peak Voc= 70V WF4 injected into the GS terminals.  Clearly, the MIG0600MS Negative Polarity 
waveform (blue, WF4+) is the inverse of the Positive Polarity waveform (black, WF4-).  Reversing the 
MIG0600MS leads (red) does not produce an inverse waveform.  Figure 12(b) shows the D-S voltage and 
current, lightning transient leakage to the D-S side of the circuit when the GS-injection leads are reversed.  
It is interesting to note that the negative-polarity GS-injected lightning transient switches D-S ON, but the 
positive-polarity transient does not.  Based upon normal MOSFET theory of operation, the positive-
polarity GS-injected transient could be expected to switch D-S to ON instead.  This phenomenon may be 
investigated further. 
Post-test, it was verified that both DC power supplies were isolated from facility-ground.  The 
MIG0600MS high-voltage outputs are isolated from facility-ground also. 
Based upon this evaluation, using the MIG0600 Negative Polarity waveform setting was determined to 
be the appropriate method of generating an inverse waveform for the tests described herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Comparison of Positive Polarity, Lead Reversal and Negative Polarity.  Peak Voc= 70V WF4 was 
injected into the G-S terminals, with VGS-bias= 8VDC and VDS-bias= 5VDC.  (a) Shows the GS voltages and currents.  
(b) Shows the D-S voltages and currents. 
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4.1.3 MOSFET Fail Levels: Pre-Test 
Over 300 tests were performed in Pre-Test, with the goal of finding the MOSFET Fail Levels when 
injecting WF4+ and WF4- into the GS or DS terminals.  VGS-bias= 8VDC and 16VDC were tested.  
Oscilloscope data were evaluated to determine the actual MOSFET terminal voltage and current at failure 
(VFail Meas & IFail Meas).  Figures 13 through 16 compare the VGS, IGS, VDS and IDS levels before and after 
failure. 
GS Injection, VGS-bias= 8V:  Figure 13 shows Fail Level data when WF4+/- was injected into the GS 
terminals with VGS-bias= 8V.  Black traces show measured V and I using a MIG0600MS Peak Voc setting 
(“Voc set”) below the level observed to cause failure.  Red traces show measured V and I with peak Voc 
set at the level observed to cause failure. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET GS terminals.  (WF4+, G-S 
pin config. Top: a & b) (WF4-,  G-S pin config. Bottom: c & d)  VGS-bias= 8 Volts for these data.  The plots on the 
left (a & c) are GS voltages and currents.  The plots on the right (b & d) are the corresponding DS voltages and 
currents resulting from the injection on the GS terminals.  (Note: Data from File 0188 is shown in (c) and (d), where 
Voc set=76V, rather than the actual fail level: Voc set=75V.) 
Time-of-failure was rather simple to determine from the G-S injection data because the MOSFET GS 
impedance would dramatically and permanently decline at some peak GS voltage point, thus causing the 
GS current to increase from milliamps to amps.  Comparing (a) and (c), the WF4- failure response 
essentially mirrors the WF4+ failure response.  The difference in Voc set needed to damage the MOSFET is 
6 Volts.  Comparing (b) and (d), it appears that when a WF4+ transient damages the GS junction, damage 
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is not evident from the DS junction I & V data (b).  However, when a WF4- transient damages the GS 
junction, damage is clearly revealed in the DS junction I &V data too (d).   
DS Injection, VGS-bias= 8V:  Figure 14 shows fail data when WF4+/- was injected into the DS 
terminals with VGS-bias= 8V.  Black traces show measured V and I using a MIG0600MS Peak Voc setting 
(“Voc set”) below the level observed to cause failure.  Red traces show measured V and I with peak Voc 
set at the level observed to cause failure. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET DS terminals.  (WF4+, D-S 
pin config. Top: a & b.) (WF4-,  D-S pin config. Bottom: c & d.)  VGS-bias= 8 Volts for these data.  The plots on the 
right (b & d) are the DS voltages and currents.  The plots on the left (a & c) are the corresponding GS voltages and 
currents resulting from the injection on the DS terminals. 
Interestingly, GS junction I & V data reveal damage more readily than the DS data, even when 
injecting the lightning waveform into the DS terminals.  Time-of-failure appeared delayed about 50us 
when injecting WF4+ into the DS terminals, possibly indicating a thermal damage characteristic.  WF4+ 
induced failure permanently lowered the GS impedance.  Comparing (b) and (d), when a WF4- transient 
damages the GS junction, damage is not evident from the DS junction I & V data (d).  Comparing (a) and 
(c), the WF4+ and WF4- injections cause entirely different I & V failure responses. 
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GS Injection, VGS-bias= 16V:  Figure 15 shows fail data when WF4+/- was injected into the GS 
terminals with VGS-bias= 16V.  Black traces show measured V and I using a MIG0600MS Peak Voc setting 
(“Voc set”) below the level observed to cause failure.  Red traces show measured V and I with peak Voc 
set at the level observed to cause failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET GS terminals.  (WF4+, G-S 
pin config. Top: a & b) (WF4-,  G-S pin config. Bottom: c & d)  VGS-bias= 16 Volts for these data.  The plots on the 
left (a & c) are GS voltages and currents.  The plots on the right (b & d) are the corresponding DS voltages and 
currents resulting from the injection on the GS terminals. 
 
Figure 15 (VGS-bias= 16 Volts) should be compared with Figure 13 (VGS-bias= 8 Volts).  The four plots 
appear remarkably similar, with a few observations.  When injecting WF4+, device failure tended to 
occur with VGS= 80V (80.00 for VGS-bias=16V, 80.17 for VGS-bias=8V).  When injecting WF4-, device 
failure tended to occur with VGS= 63.5V (-62.88 for VGS-bias=16V, -64.71 for VGS-bias=8V).  Thus GS 
Fail levels appear related to absolute peak VGS.   
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DS Injection, VGS-bias= 16V:  Figure 16 shows fail data when WF4+/- was injected into the DS 
terminals with VGS-bias= 16V.  Black traces show measured V and I using a MIG0600MS Peak Voc setting 
(“Voc set”) below the level observed to cause failure.  Red traces show measured V and I with peak Voc 
set at the level observed to cause failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET DS terminals.  (WF4+, D-S 
pin config. Top: a & b.) (WF4-,  D-S pin config. Bottom: c & d.)  VGS-bias= 16 Volts for these data.  The plots on 
the right (b & d) are the DS voltages and currents.  The plots on the left (a & c) are the corresponding GS voltages 
and currents resulting from the injection on the DS terminals. 
The four plots of Figure 16 (VGS-bias= 16 Volts) are similar to the four plots of Figure 14 (VGS-bias= 8 
Volts).  For both, the time-of-failure appeared delayed about 50us when injecting WF4+ into the DS 
terminals, possibly indicating a thermal damage characteristic.  For WF4+, increasing VGS-bias to 16 volts 
increased the damage tolerance of the VDS junction about 25% (Voc Set= 67 Volts), and nearly doubled 
the maximum IDS (25.4A for VGS-bias = 8V, vs. 48.5A for VGS-bias = 16V).  Injecting high enough WF4+ 
into the DS terminals permanently lowered the GS impedance, even after the transient had passed (see 
Table 9). 
As in Figure 14, when a WF4- transient is injected into the DS terminals, damage becomes evident 
when observing the GS junction rather than the DS junction data.  Increasing VGS-bias to 16 volts decreased 
the maximum VDS about 7% (Voc Set= -110 Volts), and decreased the maximum |IDS| about 6% (-295A 
for VGS-bias = 8V, vs. -277A for VGS-bias = 16V).  Injecting high enough WF4- into the DS terminals 
permanently lowered the GS impedance, with VGS-bias = 16V enhancing the effect (see Table 9). 
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Table 9: RGS Before and After DS Injection 
Threat 
Waveform 
VGS Bias 
(Volts) 
RGS-Normal  
(VNormal/INormal, Ohms) 
RGS-Fail  
(VFail/IFail, Ohms) 
4+  (D-S) 8 186 (8.0V/0.043A) 13.8 (4.0V/0.29) 
16 391 (16.8V/0.043A) 19.2 (9.6V/0.50A) 
4-   (D-S) 8 103 (9.3V/0.09A) 22.7 (6.8V/0.30A) 
16 454 (15.9V/0.035A) 6.7 (5.0V/0.75A) 
 
Oscilloscope data were evaluated to determine the actual MOSFET terminal voltage and current at 
failure (VFail Meas & IFail Meas).   Table 10 shows lightning generator settings (Voc Set) required to cause 
MOSFET failure (“failure” is defined as device malfunction) for each Waveform and VGS-bias setting.  
(VDS-bias was always set at 5VDC.)   
Table 10: MOSFET Fail Levels 
Device 
SN 
WF Pin 
Config. 
VGS-bias 
(VDC) 
Voc 
Set 
(Volts) 
VFail Meas 
(Volts) 
IFail Meas 
(Amps) 
Filename Figure 
D8 4+ G-S 8 70 VGS= 80.2 IGS= 0.0958 0257 13 
C7 4- G-S 8 75 VGS= -64.7 IGS= 0.0046 0190 
A2, A3 4+ D-S 8 276 RGS-Normal= 186;  RGS-Fail= 13.8  
See Fig. 14a&b 
0029, 0030 14 
D7 4- D-S 8 1460 RGS-Normal= 103;  RGS-Fail= 22.7  
See Fig. 14c&d 
0237 
D9 4+ G-S 16 64 VGS= 80.0 IGS= 0.0966 0260 15 
C8 4- G-S 16 88 VGS= -62.9 IGS= 0.0335 0206 
A8 4+ D-S 16 343 RGS-Normal= 391;  RGS-Fail= 19.2  
See Fig. 16a&b 
0085 16 
D5 4- D-S 16 1350 RGS-Normal= 454;  RGS-Fail= 6.7  
See Fig. 16c&d 
0232A 
 
 
4.1.4 Test Levels for Multiple Stroke Test Matrix 
Previous testing has shown that a MOSFET may function within specification after surviving a test at 
a given Voc setting, but may fail at that same Voc setting on subsequent tests.  The research team 
experimentally determined the highest Voc setting where a MOSFET can tolerate up to 20 lightning 
strokes without apparent failure.  Such a test models a scenario where a MOSFET is subjected to about 
two lightning strikes. (A typical lightning strike contains about 10 strokes.12) Using the data from Table 9 
as a guide, more MOSFETs were tested to determine the highest peak Voc setting where the device could 
tolerate 20 strokes without failure.  The final data are shown in Table 11.  As expected, the 20-stroke Pass 
Level was lower than the Single Stroke Fail Level for most pin configurations.   
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Table 11: MOSFET Pass Levels after 20 Strokes 
Device 
SN 
WF Pin 
Config. 
VGS-bias 
(VDC) 
Voc 
Set 
(Volts) 
Filename 
E2 4+ G-S 8 65 0269 
G5 4- G-S 8 68 0298 
S6 4+ D-S 8 265 0885* 
G8 4- D-S 8 1360 0301 
E7 4+ G-S 16 57 0279 
G1 4- G-S 16 80 0294 
F3 4+ D-S 16 320 0286 
F9 4- D-S 16 1210 0292 
*Note:  Significant testing of WF4+, D-S, VGS-bias= 8V 
was required due to “ringing” problem, discussed in Sec. 4.3. 
 
NASA/TM-2009-215794 reported VFail Meas and IFail Meas data, assuming that MOSFET failures 
would occur instantaneously, as the applied voltage or current exceeded some threshold level.  While 
WF4 injections into the G-S terminals tend cause failure as some peak threshold is exceeded, injections 
into the D-S terminals tend to cause failure about 50 microseconds after the WF4 peak amplitude has 
passed.  Therefore, VFail Meas and IFail Meas data were considered not useful for inclusion into Table 11. 
The 20-Stroke Pass Levels were taken to be the “High” setting for subsequent testing.  “Medium” and 
“Low” settings were taken to be 90%, and 80% of “High”, respectively.  The values 80% and 90% were 
selected, somewhat arbitrarily, expecting that some statistical difference may be obtained from device 
failures after subsequent aging processes (thermal, vibration, etc.) subsequently being conducted at 
NASA Ames.  A summary of the High, Medium, and Low Test Levels, along with Fail Levels is shown 
in Table 12.   
 
Table 12: Final Test Voltage Levels (Voc Set) determined from Pre-Test 
WF Pin 
Config. 
VGS-bias  
 
 
(VDC) 
FAIL   
 
 
(Voc set) 
HI 
Pass 20 
Strokes 
(Voc set) 
MED 
=90% of HI 
 
(Voc set) 
Lo 1  
=80% of HI 
 
(Voc set) 
Lo 2   
 
 
(Voc set) 
Lo 3  
 
 
(Voc set) 
4+ G-S 8 70 65 59 52   
4- G-S 8 75 68 61 54   
4+ D-S 8 276 265 239 212 200 120 
4- D-S 8 1460 1360 1292 1224   
4+ G-S 16 64 57 51 46   
4- G-S 16 88 80 72 64   
4+ D-S 16 343 320 288 256   
4- D-S 16 1350 1210 1150 1089   
 
  
22
4.2 Test Matrix 
Table 11 provides a basis of Test Voltage Levels for the Test Matrix.  The next step was to produce 
multiple samples of MOSFETS having been subjected to different test levels, varying numbers of strokes, 
different GS biasing, and varying pin-injection configurations, but still functional.   The devices could 
then be subjected to various aging processes and statistical data obtained for latent failures.  Table 13 
shows the planned Test Matrix.   
Table 13: MOSFET Test Matrix  
Pin Config. & 
Polarity 
VGS-bias 
(VDC) 
Voc Set 
Levels 
Strokes Samples 
Each 
Devices Tested 
 G-S (WF4+) 8, 16 H, M, L 5, 10, 20 5 1 x 2 x 3 x 3 x 5= 90 
 D-S (WF4+) 8, 16 H, M, L 5, 10, 20 5 1 x 2 x 3 x 3 x 5= 90 
 S-G (WF4-) 8, 16 H, M, L 5, 10, 20 5 1 x 2 x 3 x 3 x 5= 90 
 S-D (WF4-) 8, 16 H, M, L 5, 10, 20 5 1 x 2 x 3 x 3 x 5= 90 
Total Devices Needed 360 
 
All MOSFET Test Matrix data are summarized in Table 14.  The MOSFETS are subsequently being 
evaluated by NASA Ames researchers using their Aging and Characterization Platform for semiconductor 
components, for the purpose of developing predictive algorithms as part of IVHM prognostic health 
management program goals. 
 
  
23
Table 14: MOSFET Test Matrix Data Summary 
Pin 
Config  VGS 
Stro
kes  Level  Device SN & (Filenames) 
Pin 
Config  VGS 
Stro
kes  Level Device SN & Filenames 
G‐S 
(WF4+) 
8V  5  
HI  G9 H0 H1 H2 H3 (0302 to 0311)  D‐S (WF4+)
8V 5  HI RC RD RE RF RG (0835 to 0844); T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 (0896 to 0905)*; 
KM KN KP KR KS (1115 to 1124) 
MED  J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 (0330 to 0334)  MED T7 T8 T9 U0 U1 (0906 to 0915)*; LT LU LV MK ML (1145 to 1154) 
LO1  J9 K0 K1 K2 K3 (0345 to 0349)  LO1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 (0936 to 0945)*  NM NN NP NR NS (1175 to 1184) 
10   HI  H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 (0312 to 0321)  LO2 CT CU CV DK DL (0966 to 0975) 
MED  I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 (0335 TO 0339)  LO3 EM EN EP ER ES (0996 to 1005) 
LO1  K4 K5 K6 K7 K8 (0350 TO 0354)  10  HI
RH RI RJ R0 R1 (0845 to 0854); S7 S8 S9 TO T1 (0886 to 0895)*; 
KT KU LK KV LL (1125 to 1134) 
20  
HI  H9 I0 I1 I2 I3 (0322 to 0329)  MED
U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 (0916 to 0925)*; MM MN MP MR MS (1155 to 
1164) 
MED  I9 J0 J6 J7 J8 (0340 to 0344)  LO1 V7 V8 V9 CK CL (0946 to 0955)*  NT NU NV PK PL (1185 to 1194) 
LO1  K9 L0 L1 L2 L3 (0355 to 0359)  LO2 DM DN DP DR DS (0976 to 0985) 
16V  5   HI  BH BI BJ CA CB (0567 to 0576)  LO3 ET EU EV FK FL (1006 to 1015) 
MED  DC DD DE DF DG (0595 to 0604)  20  HI S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 (0876 to 0885)*; LM LN LP LR LS (1135 to 1144) 
LO1  EH EI EJ FA FB (0625 to 0634)  MED U7 U8 U9 V0 V1 (0926 to 0935)*; MT MV MU NK NL (1165 to 1174) 
10   HI  CC CD CE CF CG (0577 to 0586)  LO1 CM CN CP CR CS (0956 to 0965)*; PM PN PP PR PS (1195 to 1204) 
MED  DH DI DJ EA EB (0605 to 0614)  LO2 DT DU DV EK EL (0986 to 0995) 
LO1  FC FD FE FF FG (0635 to 0644)  LO3 FM FN FP FR FS (1016 to 1025) 
20   HI  CH CI CJ DA DB (0587 to 0594)  16V 5  HI GC GD GE GF GG (0655 to 0664) 
MED  EC ED EE EF EG (0615 to 0624)  MED HH HI HJ IA IB (0685 to 0694) 
LO1  FH FI FJ GA GB (0645 to 0654)  LO1 JC JD JE JF JG (0715 to 0724) 
G‐S 
(WF4‐) 
8V  5   HI  L7 L8 L9 P0 P1 (0388 to 0397)  10  HI GH GI GJ HA HB (0665 to 0674) 
MED  N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 (0417 to 0426)  MED IC ID IE IF IG (0695 to 0704) 
LO1  M7 M8 M9 W0 W1 (0447 to 0456) LO1 JH JI JJ KA KB (0725 to 0734) 
10   HI  P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 (0398 to 0407)  20  HI HC HD HE HF HG (0675 to 0684) 
MED  N7 N8 N9 M0 M1 (0427 to 0436)  MED IH II IJ JA JB (0705 to 0714) 
LO1  W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 (0457 to 0466) LO1 KC KD KE KF KG (0735 to 0744) 
20  HI  P7 P8 P9 N0 N1 (0408 to  0416)   D‐S 
(WF4‐)
8V 5  HI FT FU FV GK GL (1026 to 1035) 
MED  M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 (0437 to 0446)  MED HM HN HP HR HS (1055 to 1064) 
LO1  W7 W8 W9 X0 X1 (0467 to 0476)   LO1 IT IU IV JK JL (1085 to 1094) 
16V  5   HI  AC AD AE AF AG (0537 to 0546)  10  HI GM GN GP GR GS (1036 to 1044) 
MED  Y7 Y8 Y9 Z0 Z1 (0507 to 0516)  MED HT HU HV IK IL (1065 to 1074) 
LO1  X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 (0477 to 0486)  LO1 JM JN JP JR JS (1095 to 1104) 
10   HI  AH AI AJ BA BB (0547 to 0556)  20  HI GT GU GV HK HL (1045 to 1054) 
MED  Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 (0517 to 0526)  MED IM IN IP IR IS (1075 to 1084) 
LO1  X7 X8 X9 Y0 Y1 (0487 to 0496)  LO1 JT JU JV KK KL (1105 to 1114) 
20  
HI  BC BD BE BF BG (0557 to 0566)  16V 5  HI
KH KI KJ LA LB (0745 to 0754); PT PU PV RK RL (1205 to 1214); 
VM VN VP VR VS (1295 to 1304) 
MED  Z7 Z8 Z9 AA AB (0527 to 0536)  MED
MC MD ME MF MG (0775 to 0784); SM SN SP SR SS (1235 to 1244); 
WT WU WV XK XL (1325 to 1334) 
LO1  Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 (0497 to 0506)  LO1 NH NI NJ PA PB (0805 to 0814); TT TU TV UK UL (1265 to 1274) 
10  HI LC LD LE LF LG (0755 to 0764); RM RN RP RR RS (1215 to 1224); 
VT VU VV WK WL (1305 to 1314) 
MED MH MI MJ NA NB (0785 to 0794); ST SU SV TK TL (1245 to 1254); 
XM XN (1335 to 1338) 
LO1 PC PD PE PF PG (0815 to 0824); UM UN UP UR US (1275 to 1284) 
20  HI LH LI LF MA MB (0765 to 0774); RT RU RV SK SL (1225 to 1234); 
WM WN WP WR WS (1315 to 1324) 
MED NC ND NE NF NG (0795 to 0804); TM TN TP TR TS (1255 to 1264) 
LO1 PH PI PJ RA RB (0825 to 0834); UT UU UV VK VL (1285 to 1294) 
Notes:  -Red Devices were “shiny” devices- Not Type N.    (Hi Level: Voc Set=275V only for the IRF520 devices.  
More information below. See Fig. 17.) 
 -Failed Devices are labeled with strikethrough 
 -* “Ringing” observed on some tests.  Resolved with Ferrite placed on GS power supply beginning with 
file 0966.  (See Section 4.3 for more information.) 
 -Blue Devices tested, but only Ch4 Oscilloscope data were saved. 
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4.2.1  IRF520 Versus IRF520N Devices 
During the course of testing with DS pin-injection, some IRF520 devices were accidentally mixed-in 
with the IRF520N test samples.  Data for these devices was collected, and is differentiated in red color in 
Table 14.  The difference was discovered, and the tests were repeated on IRF520N devices.  It was 
experimentally determined that the IRF520 devices could sustain 20 strokes at Voc set at 275V, but the 
IRF520N devices needed Voc set to 265V in order to sustain 20 strokes without failure.  Figure 17 shows 
a photograph of the two different types of MOSFET.  Figure 18 shows oscilloscope data comparisons 
between the IRF520 (Black) and IRF520N (Blue). 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 17:  IRF520N (left) versus IRF520 (right, “shiny”) MOSFETS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET DS terminals.  (WF4+, D-S 
pin config. VGS-bias= 8 Volts, Top: a & b.) (WF4-,  D-S pin config. VGS-bias= 16 Volts, Bottom: c & d.)  for these 
data.  The plots on the right (b & d) are the DS voltages and currents.  The plots on the left (a & c) are the 
corresponding G-S voltages and currents resulting from the injection on the D-S terminals. 
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4.3 The “Ringing” Anomaly 
During D-S injection testing with WF4+ and VGS-bias= 8VDC, “ringing” was observed on all four 
oscilloscope channels (see Fig. 19, Ch. 1: VGS, Ch. 2: IGS, Ch. 3: VDS, Ch. 4: IDS).  Ringing was 
increasingly likely with Voc Set levels exceeding 160V.  The ringing randomly occurred for about half 
the injection tests, otherwise it was not present.  Initial troubleshooting included replacing TVS devices, 
the MOSFET circuit board, R4 and MOSFET, but these did not influence the ringing phenomena. 
When performing D-S injection testing with VGS-bias= 16VDC, the ringing phenomena did not re-occur 
for either WF4+ or WF4-.  
Subsequent D-S injection testing with VGS-bias= 8VDC and WF4+ again caused ringing, randomly, for 
about half the injection tests.  It was observed that placing a ferrite core around either the positive or 
negative terminal of the VGS-bias power supply eliminated the ringing.  Placing the ferrite core over either 
VDS-bias power supply terminal had no effect.  The Test Matrix was completed using the ferrite core 
installed on the VGS-bias power supply positive terminal.  A photograph of the ferrite core, installed, is 
provided as Figure 20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Oscilloscope display of “ringing” phenomena.   (Ch. 1: VGS, Ch. 2: IGS, Ch. 3: VDS, Ch. 4: IDS) 
After completion of the Test Matrix, other options for providing low-pass filtering on the GS biasing 
circuit were evaluated.  All options essentially eliminated higher frequency coupling to the power supply, 
and mitigated the ringing.  These included the following: 
 Replace VGS power supply with 9V battery  
 Replace VGS power supply with 4 “D” cells (6.43V) 
 Place 22,000 uF capacitor in parallel with VGS power supply terminals. 
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Figure 20: Installation of ferrite core on VGS+ Power supply terminal. 
 
4.4 Survey of Damage Assessment Techniques Based Upon Inspection 
The ability to understand the physics of semiconductor failure is useful for diagnosis and prognosis of 
failures caused by lightning and other EMI events.  The research team evaluated several damage 
assessment techniques based upon inspection.  Optical and electron microscopy inspection requires 
removal of semiconductor packaging and cross-sectioning, rendering the device unusable for inspection 
of other cross-sections.   Non-destructive inspection techniques use wavelengths that penetrate the 
semiconductor package, without damaging it, and include X-Ray and ultrasonic imaging of the die and 
wiring internal to the package.  These imaging technologies are available to many research facilities and 
universities.  MIL-STD-883E describes some use of X-Ray, ultrasonic imaging and microscope 
inspection techniques for evaluating workmanship and durability of microcircuits.   
After the Test Matrix was completed, 24 additional MOSFETs were subjected to lightning transient 
tests, for the purpose of providing samples for damage assessment based upon inspection. After review of 
the Fail Level data, test conditions were set for the following rationale: 
 Reference Device: No Transient applied.  (Device SN 2R) 
 3 Voc Set Levels: VFail, 2 x VFail, VHi-20 Strokes : Intent was to ensure damage on one device 
(2x), while inducing varying degrees of damage for comparison. 
 Both G-S and D-S pin configurations (Not G-D): Pre-Test data indicate that different failure 
mechanisms are occurring on GS versus DS injections. 
 Both Polarities of WF4, + and –: Pre-Test data indicate that different failure mechanisms are 
occurring for + and – waveforms. 
 Gate Bias= 16V: Fail levels for DS injection were lower for VGS= 16V than for VGS= 8V, and 
were so high that a 2x test was not possible anyway.  VGS= 16V provided higher confidence 
of more damage. 
 2 Samples of Each Device. 
 
A Test Matrix for the 24 devices is shown in Table 15.  
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Table 15: Devices Tested to Fail, for Damage Assessment Based Upon Inspection.   
Device 
SN 
Device 
Sample 
WF4 
+/- 
Inj. 
Term. 
VGS Voc 
Set 
Stroke 
# 
Results Filename 
1G 1 4+ G-S  16 64 1 VFail 1351 
1H 2 4+ G-S  16 64 1 VFail 1352 
1I 1 4+ G-S  16 128 1 2xVFail 1353 
1J 2 4+ G-S  16 128 1 2xVFail 1354 
1K 1 4+ G-S  16 57 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1355 
1L 2 4+ G-S  16 57 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1356 
1M 1 4+ D-S  16 343 1 VFail 1357 
1N 2 4+ D-S  16 343 1 VFail 1358 
1P 1 4+ D-S  16 686 1 2xVFail 1359 
1R 2 4+ D-S  16 686 1 2xVFail 1360 
1S 1 4+ D-S  16 320 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1361 
1T 2 4+ D-S  16 320 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1362 
1A 1 4- G-S  16 88 1 VFail 1345 
1B 2 4- G-S  16 88 1 VFail 1346 
1C 1 4- G-S  16 176 1 2xVFail 1347 
1D 2 4- G-S  16 176 1 2xVFail 1348 
1E 1 4- G-S  16 80 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1349 
1F 2 4- G-S  16 80 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1350 
XP 1 4- D-S  16 1350 1 VFail 1339 
XR 2 4- D-S  16 1350 1 VFail 1340 
XS 1 4- D-S  16 1700 1 2xVFail 1341 
XT 2 4- D-S  16 1700 1 2xVFail 1342 
XU 1 4- D-S  16 1210 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1343 
XV 2 4- D-S  16 1210 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1344 
(Device SN 2R was not exposed to any lightning transient: i.e. Reference Device) 
 
4.4.1  Microscope Inspection 
Solid state devices are packaged to provide reliable operation under extreme thermal, vibration and 
chemical environments.  Evidence of heating or burning on the solid state package may be observable if 
the device is subjected to sufficient energy input, however it’s far more likely that damage to the 
semiconductor die, adhesive, or wire bonding would occur prior to damage to the packaging.  Such device 
damage is not possible to see without the packaging removed.  Figure 21 shows an IRF520 MOSFET that 
was cross-section cut to reveal the die and bonding wire.   
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 21: Cross Section cut performed on IRF520 MOSFET. 
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Microscope inspection of the die is possible, but requires precision cutting and maybe polishing to 
allow proper focusing on a particular region of interest.  Overall die dimensions are about 2mm x 2mm.  
It may be possible to chemically dissolve the packaging material, while leaving the semiconductor die, 
adhesive, or wire bonding intact, but this was not pursued. 
Determining specific damage using microscopic inspection would also require prior knowledge of the 
die design, and where to look for damage.  The difficulty of performing microscopic inspection increases 
significantly for more complex logic devices. Images of electrostatic discharge (ESD) damage to 
integrated circuits may be found on the Internet, some obtained by using a scanning electron microscope 
(SEM).  Inspection using a SEM requires extremely precise positioning of the target and a metalized 
coating to be applied to the inspection region.   
4.4.2 X-Ray Inspection 
The NASA LaRC Nondestructive Evaluation Sciences Branch (D313) provided the service of an X-
TEK HMX ST X-Ray and computed tomography (CT) scanner.  Figure 22 shows images obtained of a 
IRF520N MOSFET die and internal wiring.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 22: X-Ray images of IRF520N MOSFET die, adhesive and internal wiring. 
 
X-Ray scans were particularly suited for revealing the major components present within the MOSFET 
package: heat sink, wiring, adhesive, and the semiconductor die.  However, it was not possible to resolve 
details on the die itself, or the integrity of wire-bonding to the die.  Often, it was difficult to resolve the 
internal wiring.  Several other semiconductor packages were also imaged, with varying degrees of 
success, but did not provide confidence that X-ray inspection is useful for detecting damage within the die 
caused by lightning waveforms.  
Further evaluation of the devices shown in Table 15 may occur at a later date. 
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5 Preliminary Damage Assessment Based on Electrical Parameters 
The primary objective of the testing was to provide a set of MOSFETs suitable for analysis of damage 
effects, aging, and development of damage propagation models.  Electrical characterization tests were 
performed to obtain an approximate measurement of the damage incurred by the injected-devices using a 
source measurement unit (SMU). The SMU used was a Keithley 2410 series. Specifically, the parameters 
that were tested are described below: 
 Breakdown voltage V(BR)DSS: Voltage level at which the drain-source path of the device starts 
conducting drain current, given that the gate is not biased. Essentially measures the 
breakdown rating of the body diode. Thus, under normal operation, this current should be 
very low (in the A range) since the drain-source path behaves like an open circuit when the 
gate-bias is 0. As the applied voltage VDS increases it approaches the breakdown rating of the 
diode and a significantly large current starts flowing through the drain. 
 Leakage Current IDSS: Current flowing from drain to source as the gate is shorted with the 
source (no gate bias).  Represents the leakage current characteristics of the body diode.  
 Threshold Voltage VGS(th): Minimum voltage required to bias the gate in order for the device 
to switch ON and allow drain current to flow.  The SMU equipment provides a voltage sweep 
and measures the corresponding drain current till VGS reaches a value where the drain current 
starts growing exponentially. 
 
NASA/TM-2009-215794 provides additional information about Breakdown Voltage, Leakage Current 
and Threshold Voltage, including schematic diagrams. 
It was generally observed from the SMU analysis that for WF4-, D-S (), extremely high voltages 
were required to produce any significant damage. Similarly for WF4+, D-S (), high levels of injection 
(lower than that for the WF4-, D-S configuration) were required to observe any damage.  In most 
cases, for such high levels of injections, the devices were completely destroyed. However, significant 
damage could be observed in many cases with much lower injection voltage for the G-S (both  and ) 
configurations.  Thus, it is of more interest to analyze these cases as they are more susceptible to damage. 
This preliminary assessment will focus on the injections using WF4+, G-S () configurations only. 
Table 16 shows the damage levels observed using the SMU for the injection at the gate. The 
normalized change in parameter values for the affected devices was calculated in order to estimate the 
effect of the different configurations. The mean values of the normalized parameter changes are also 
shown in the Table 16.  
For the G-S configuration, it was observed that the threshold voltage decreased with increase in the 
voltage intensity, gate bias, number of strokes and a combination of these factors. It was also observed 
that in the injection configuration with high intensity and 20 strokes, a very high deviation occurred in the 
device behavior. Not only was significant leakage (IDSS) observed, in many cases the breakdown 
characteristic was completely altered. This was observed for both gate bias voltage values of 8V and 16V. 
Figures 22, 23 and 24 are shown for one such case. As observed from these characteristics, the devices 
have incurred very high damage and in general may not be used for further normal operation. However, 
for lower levels of injection intensity, such high levels of damage were not observed, as seen in Table 16 
only the threshold voltage decreased. Figure 25 shows the decrease in threshold voltage for such a device.  
The authors suggest that this decrease in threshold voltage may be explained in the following manner: As 
the intensity of the injection applied at the gate is increased, the oxide and the underlying silicon started 
incurring damage which starts modifying the turn-on behavior. As this injection is further intensified, the 
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gate-oxide starts to breakdown which can then lead to conductive paths within the oxide. Such conduction 
paths would create various sources of leakage currents leading to significantly non-ideal behavior of the 
device.  In addition, the body of the device also undergoes very high stress due to the high current flowing 
through it, as well as the presence of the high electric field. Damage to the body gets reflected in our 
characterization curves through the breakdown voltage and leakage current characteristics (Figures 23 and 
24).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Turn-On characterization for lightning injected device in GS configuration, injection intensity H, strokes 
= 20 and gate bias = 8V 
 
 
Table 16: Summary of change in device characterization after lightning waveform injection.  All data is with WF4+ 
pin injection (). 
Pin 
Config.  
Voc Set 
Levels 
VGS-bias 
(VDC) 
Strokes Results 
G-S H 8 5 Mean decrease in VGS(th) by 0.0243V 
G-S H 8 10 Mean decrease in VGS(th) by 0.0647V 
G-S H 8 20 Devices were significantly damaged with high leakage 
G-S M 16 All Mean decrease in VGS(th) by 0.0095V 
G-S H 16 5 Mean decrease in VGS(th) by 0.0361V 
G-S H 16 10 Mean decrease in VGS(th) by 0.0847V 
G-S H 16 20 Devices were significantly damaged with high leakage 
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Figure 23: Leakage characterization for lightning injected device in GS configuration, injection intensity H, strokes 
= 20 and gate bias = 8V. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Breakdown characterization for lightning injected device in GS configuration, injection intensity H, 
strokes = 20 and gate bias = 8V. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Turn-On characterization for lightning injected device in GS configuration, injection intensity M, strokes 
= 10 and gate bias = 8V.     
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6 Summary and Conclusions 
This report describes lightning pin injection tests with IRF520N MOSFETs in the “ON” state.  Test 
setups, test problems and solutions, device fail-levels, Test Matrix, and survey of damage assessment 
techniques based upon inspection, are provided herein.  Table 14 includes a comprehensive matrix of all 
MOSFETs available to for ongoing NASA Ames semiconductor fault mode and aging research. 
A pin-injection test circuit was designed, fabricated and demonstrated to meet the necessary criteria: 
 
 Protection of biasing circuitry from the lightning transient. 
 Protection of the MOSFET from excessive current applied by biasing circuitry. 
 Protection of the Lightning Generator from excessive current applied by biasing circuitry. 
 Assurance that biasing circuitry does not corrupt the MOSFET test results by modifying the 
lightning transient waveform. 
 
Results show that GS-injection failures appear related to peak applied voltage and DS-injection 
failures appear related to energy input.  DS–injection failure results show that lightning transient 
susceptibility characteristics of MOSFETs are significantly affected by VGS-bias.    When performing 
certification testing on aircraft equipment, it’s important to carefully consider the fact that lightning 
damage levels are dependent upon circuit operational parameters at the time of the strike.   
RTCA/DO-160E suggests that connecting the lightning waveform generator via cable induction may 
be a suitable alternative to direct injection, especially if it becomes too difficult to meet the above criteria.  
(Direct injection was performed for this test.)  Cable induction testing may provide the advantage of 
preserving system impedances and biasing levels to values representative of actual operation, however it 
may be difficult to ensure that the MOSFET biasing levels are representative of the entire range of 
operation. 
RTCA/DO-160E also allows a representative circuit to be pin-injection tested, so that pins of a similar 
group can be qualified by similarity.  Again, it’s important to ensure that the MOSFET biasing levels on 
the other circuits are representative of their operational range. 
A survey of damage assessment techniques based upon inspection is provided, and includes data for 
optical microscope and X-ray inspection.  Microscope inspection of the semiconductor die requires 
precision cross-section cutting and prior knowledge of the die design just to know where to look for 
damage.  Even then, it’s uncertain what damage may look like. With X-Ray inspection, it was not 
possible to resolve details on the die itself, or the integrity of wire-bonding to the die. 
Preliminary damage assessments based upon electrical parameters show that the threshold voltage 
(VGS(th)) may decrease with subsequent lightning waveform strokes.   Such changes are expected to affect 
the switching behavior of the device, since with a lower threshold voltage the MOSFET would take less 
gate voltage to turn ON and hence the device would switch ON much earlier.  Thus the device may 
continue to function in a degraded manner, before complete failure eventually occurs. 
Research to computationally model damage and better understand failure modes is ongoing.  Device 
aging studies are focused upon inducing intrinsic failure mechanisms. With improved understanding of 
the aging process, the next step will be to age the MOSFETS that have been injected (see Table 14). 
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